Once a provisional agreement has been reached between the employer and the union representatives, each member of the union has the opportunity to vote in favour of acceptance or rejection. If at least 50% of the union members who actually vote accept the agreement, it becomes legally binding. If union members do not accept the agreement, the employer and union representatives can continue negotiations. Alternatively, the union may call for a strike vote. A strike vote must also receive at least 50% support from voters. Very rarely, where a union cannot obtain ratification or strike authorization, it will give up its right to represent workers. The labour and employment legislation adopted by the Finnish Parliament lays the foundations for collective agreements. As the minimum wage is not defined in Finnish labour and employment legislation, workers` wages are based on collective agreements negotiated by trade unions. The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work reaffirms the importance of effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. As regards the main features, the greatest attention has been paid to the role of centralisation, i.e. at the dominant level of negotiations. In the early 1980s, the corporatist view suggested that centralization, conceived as a national negotiation, could yield superior results in terms of macroeconomic performance and labor market performance (Cameron, 1984[7]).8 However, opponents stressed that wage increases would be retained or that resource allocation would be more efficient, whether market forces have a more important role to play.

the example of the United States or the United Kingdom to Thatcher to support this point of view. The classification of countries in 2015 was reduced until 1980 using information contained in the database Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) 14 The time differences in the resulting taxonomy of collective bargaining systems for OECD countries for the period 1980-2015 are considerable – see Annex 3.A. . .